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Who’s Holding Out?  
An Experimental Study of the Benefits and Burdens of Eminent Domain
*
 
 
By Abel M. Winn and Matthew W. McCarter 
 
Abstract 
A substantial literature identifies seller holdout as a serious obstacle to land assembly, implying 
that eminent domain is an appropriate policy response.  We conduct a series of laboratory 
experiments to test this view.  We find that when there is no competition and no eminent domain, 
land assembly suffers from costly delay and failed assembly; participants lose 18.1% of the 
available surplus.  Much of the inefficiency is due to low offers from the buyers (“buyer 
holdout”) rather than strategic holdout among sellers.  When buyers can exercise eminent 
domain the participants lose 18.6% of the surplus.  This loss comes from spending money to 
influence the fair market price and forcing sellers to sell even when the sellers value the property 
more than the buyer.  Introducing weak competition in the form of a less valuable substitute 
parcel of land reduces delay by 35.7% and virtually eliminates assembly failure, so that only 
11.5% of the surplus is lost. 
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I. Introduction 1 
 A substantial theoretical literature identifies seller holdout as a significant impediment to 2 
efficient land assembly (Calabresi and Malamed 1972, Eckart 1985, Bittlingmayer 1988, Cohen 3 
1991, Epstein 1992, 1993, Strange 1995 and Menezes and Pitchford 2004) and a possible 4 
justification for eminent domain (Allen 2000, Miceli and Sirmans 2007, Rose 2011).  Suppose, 5 
for example, that two landowners with adjoining property each value their own parcel at 6 
$100,000 and a developer wishes to acquire both parcels.  The development is such that both 7 
parcels are necessary for its completion.  His maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) is $0 for 8 
either one of the parcels but $250,000 for the pair.  This may impede efficient assembly because 9 
both sellers are in a position to hold out for a large share of the surplus.  Strategic holdout can 10 
draw out the bargaining process, causing costly delay or assembly failure.  This is especially 11 
likely if the negotiating parties face uncertainty about one another’s valuations for the land 12 
(Shupp, et al. 2013). 13 
 The holdout problem in land assembly is a special case of the tragedy of the 14 
anticommons (Heller 1998, Buchanan and Yoon 2000, Fennell 2004).  An anticommons is a 15 
property regime in which multiple agents have the unilateral right to prevent the use of a 16 
resource.  Examples include water rights transfers (Corbin 2011), assembling pharmaceutical 17 
patents (Heller and Eisenberg 1998) and assembling contiguous blocks of the broadcast spectrum 18 
(Hazlett 2008, 2014).  In each case, too many agents with veto power can hinder a resource’s use 19 
and reduce economic efficiency. 20 
In the case of land assembly, eminent domain allows a developer to reduce delay and 21 
ensure assembly by forcing a recalcitrant landowner to sell her property. However, eminent 22 
domain may lead to inefficient assembly and invite influence costs. Inefficient assembly occurs 23 
where the sum of the fragmented owners’ values for their land exceeds the value of the 24 
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development but they are forced to sell.  As Munch (1976) points out, the danger of under-25 
assembly through market mechanisms is mirrored by the danger of over-assembly through 26 
eminent domain (see also O’Flaherty, 1994; Miceli and Segerson, 2007; Shavell, 2010). 27 
 The threat of inefficient assembly is not idle speculation.  In the case of Kelo v. New 28 
London the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of transfering private land to a private 29 
developer.  The main beneficiary was to be Pfizer, Inc., which would receive a $300 million 30 
research center.  The case was decided in 2005 and seven families were evicted from their 31 
property, their houses demolished or moved offsite.  Yet the development group never managed 32 
to raise financing and gave up the project in 2008.  Pfizer left the city of New London the 33 
following year.  As of 2015 the land where Ms. Kelo and her six neighbors lived remained an 34 
undeveloped field. 35 
Eminent domain also imposes influence costs in determining the “fair market value” of 36 
the land; i.e., the price that is to be paid to the owner.  This price is determined through a legal 37 
process in which both the buyer and seller(s) must, at the very least, obtain counsel and pay for 38 
separate and independent appraisals of the property.  Both sides improve their chances of a 39 
favorable price by expending more resources on the legal process relative to their opponent.   40 
The result of the legal process is that much of the surplus may be spent influencing the 41 
final price.  In 2013 the city of Modesto, California used eminent domain proceedings to 42 
purchase a portion of one resident’s property for $120,000.  The city spent $180,000 in legal fees 43 
(Valine 2013).  Moreover, more than two decades of experimental work has shown that 44 
participants in contests (like a court battle) frequently overspend relative to their Nash 45 
Equilibrium strategies.  For a survey of the literature, see Dechenaux, Kovenock and Sheremeta 46 
(2015). 47 
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 A number of experimental studies of land assembly demonstrate that seller holdout does 48 
occur and can be costly.  (We provide an overview of these results in the following section.) This 49 
has led some investigators to suggest that eminent domain may be a necessary tool for efficient 50 
land aggregation (Swope, et al. 2011, Cadigan, et al. 2011).  However, to date the experimental 51 
study of efficiency under a regime of eminent domain versus secure property is limited to a 52 
single study (Kitchens and Roomets 2015) that omits several important features of the land 53 
assembly problem.  Delay in assembly is costless in their experiments, court fees are born only 54 
by the buyer and determined exogenously, the court-determined price is known with certainty to 55 
all parties and assembly is efficient in all negotiations. 56 
In this paper we provide a comparison between secure property and eminent domain that 57 
incorporates inefficient assembly and influence costs.  Eminent domain is not efficiency 58 
enhancing in our experiments.  Participants captured 81.9% of the available surplus when buyers 59 
had no alternative to assembly and no recourse to eminent domain.  They captured 81.4% of the 60 
available surplus when buyers could exercise eminent domain and the fair market price was 61 
determined by a contest in which both parties could improve their odds of winning by expending 62 
more resources.  In a third treatment the developer could buy a less valuable substitute parcel of 63 
land instead of assembling parcels from the two primary sellers.  Participants captured 88.5% of 64 
the available surplus in this treatment. 65 
 Interestingly, we find that buyers “hold out” more frequently than sellers.  In the baseline 66 
treatment with secure property and no competition the sellers rejected a profitable offer in 22.6% 67 
of cases, while 60% of buyers’ final offers were lower than the profit-maximizing offer.  The rate 68 
of seller holdout was 6.7% in the treatment with competition and 4.3% in the treatment with 69 
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eminent domain.  These rates do not differ statistically; weak competition was as effective at 70 
breaking up seller holdout as eminent domain. 71 
II. Prior Studies of Land Assembly 72 
Two empirical papers use land sale data to estimate a premium for assembled land 73 
compared to unassembled land.  Cunningham (2013) uses GIS maps of Seattle, Washington to 74 
identify assemblies that resulted in new construction between 2005 and 2007.  He combines this 75 
data with sale prices and property characteristics to estimate a hedonic regression.  Cunningham 76 
(2013) finds that properties that were assembled for new construction sold at a 17% premium. 77 
Yuming, McMillen and Somerville (2016) study the assembly of small parcels in the 78 
urban core of Hong Kong between 1991 and 1998.  They find that parcels that were redeveloped 79 
as part of a land assembly sold for a premium of 8 – 10% compared to parcels that were 80 
redeveloped individually.  The final parcel acquired in an assembly sold for a 12% premium. 81 
Brooks and Lutz (2016) study land assembly in Los Angeles, California between 1999 82 
and 2010.  They use properties where the existing structure was torn down after sale as a control 83 
group against which to compare properties that were assembled.  They find that assembly 84 
properties sold at a premium of 15% - 40% depending on the modelling specification. 85 
These studies are consistent with seller holdout, but they are not conclusive.  As Brooks 86 
and Lutz (2016) point out, a premium for assembled land proves that there are frictions in land 87 
assembly, but those frictions can come from private sources (e.g., holdout and strategic delay) or 88 
public sources (e.g., restrictive zoning and building codes).  It is not possible to determine how 89 
much of the assembly premium is due to holdout with the data that Cunningham (2013), 90 
Yuming, MicMillen and Somerville (2016) and Brooks and Lutz (2016) analyze. 91 
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A second difficulty in using field data to study holdout is that sellers who have put their 92 
property up for sale (active sellers) likely have lower reservation prices than sellers who have 93 
been approached by a developer (passive sellers).  A buyer who wishes to redevelop a single 94 
property bargains with active sellers and can expect to pay the prevailing market price.  But a 95 
buyer who needs multiple contiguous properties will almost certainly have to bargain with at 96 
least one passive seller, who is in no hurry to sell and values her property above the market price.  97 
Thus, assembled properties are likely to have higher reservation prices even in the absence of 98 
private frictions. 99 
Laboratory experiments offer a way of observing holdout directly and comparing land 100 
assembly under alternative legal frameworks.  Several laboratory studies have examined the 101 
holdout problem.  The most relevant for our research are those by Cadigan, et al. (2009, 2011), 102 
Swope, et al. (2011), Collins and Isaac (2012), Parente and Winn (2012), Shupp, et al. (2013), 103 
Cadigan, Schmitt and Swope (2014), Zillante, Read and Schwarz (2014), Kitchens and Roomets 104 
(2015) and Isaac, Kitchens and Portillo (2016).  We summarize these studies in Table 1, listing 105 
the treatment variables the authors studied and the primary results.   106 
Strategic holdout occurred in all of the studies, although failure to assemble land tended 107 
to be infrequent.  Across all of the studies in Table 1 there were 3,036 negotiations in which 108 
assembly failure could occur.  It occurred in 299 (9.8%) of them.  Failure rates were lowest in 109 
treatments where there was some competition among the sellers.  Cadigan, et al. (2011) 110 
conducted experiments in which the assembler negotiated with three landowners but needed only 111 
two parcels.  Out of 64 groups none failed to assemble the necessary parcels.  Parente and Winn 112 
(2012) also conducted experiments in which the assembler (represented by the software) needed 113 
two parcels and faced three landowners.  Out of 768 negotiations where assembly failure was 114 
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possible, it occurred only 6 times, a failure rate of 0.8%.  Isaac, Kitchens and Portillo (2016) 115 
created competition in two ways.  First, similar to Cadigan, et al. (2011) and Parente and Winn 116 
(2012) they had two treatments in which a buyer faced four sellers but needed to assemble only 117 
two or three parcels.  Out of 64 negotiations across these treatments assembly failure occurred in 118 
only five.  In a third competitive treatment the buyer could either assemble all four of the 119 
primary parcels or purchase a single parcel from an alternative seller.
2
  In this treatment one 120 
negotiation failed out of 28. 121 
The only experimental study of eminent domain of which we are aware was conducted by 122 
Kitchens and Roomets (2015).  In their experiments a buyer negotiated sequentially with four 123 
sellers who each had a $4 private use value for their properties.  If he successfully purchased all 124 
four parcels the buyer received $50 minus the sum of negotiated prices.  The sellers were paid 125 
the prices they had negotiated if they sold voluntarily.  The buyer’s and sellers’ values were 126 
common knowledge.  Once a seller agreed to a price it became common knowledge as well. 127 
In one treatment the buyer used contingent contracts.  Any seller in the sequence could 128 
“walk away” from the negotiations, but this voided all prior contracts.  In this case the sellers 129 
each received a private use value of $4 for their property and the buyer was not paid.  In the 130 
other treatment all contracts were binding but the buyer could take properties through eminent 131 
domain.  Each time he invoked eminent domain the buyer paid the seller a predetermined price 132 
of $4 and paid court fees of $8.50.  The court fees were parameterized such that if the buyer took 133 
all four properties the available gains from trade would be completely consumed. 134 
Kitchens and Roomets (2015) found that prices were roughly the same under contingent 135 
contracts and eminent domain.  They also found that efficiency was statistically indistinguishable 136 
                                                          
2
 The buyer had the same induced value for assembling the four smaller parcels as for purchasing the larger 
alternative parcel.  This is a key distinction between the design employed by Isaac, Kitchens and Portillo (2016) and 
our design. 
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across treatments.  Participants captured an average of 91.7% of the available surplus with 137 
contingent contracts and 93.2% with eminent domain.  Thus, in their experimental environment 138 
and institutions eminent domain was not welfare enhancing. 139 
These results are informative and important, but Kitchens’ and Roomets’ (2015) 140 
experimental design omits several features of the land assembly problem.  First, they did not 141 
incorporate costs of delayed assembly, so assembly failure was the only possible source of 142 
inefficiency in their contingent contracts treatment.  This is significant because strategic holdout 143 
is a dominated strategy in a single-period negotiation with complete information.  As noted 144 
above, assembly failure does not occur frequently in land assembly experiments, thus the bulk of 145 
inefficiency generally comes from costly delay.  This omission may positively bias efficiency in 146 
Kitchens’ and Roomets’ (2015) contingent contracts treatment. 147 
Second, the buyer’s value for the assembled properties was always considerably greater 148 
than the sum of the sellers’ private use values.  Thus, assembly failure posed the largest threat to 149 
efficiency, and this could only occur in the contingent contracts treatment.  There was no 150 
possibility of inefficient assembly in the eminent domain treatment.  This may positively bias 151 
efficiency in their eminent domain treatment. 152 
Third, buyers and sellers in these experiments faced a known fair market price that was 153 
equal to the sellers’ private use values.  In actual cases of eminent domain the buyer and seller(s) 154 
spend money in the courts because they expect to influence the price in their favor. 155 
Finally, court costs in Kitchens’ and Roomets’ (2015) experiments were determined 156 
exogenously and fell only on the buyer.  In the field sellers often expend resources on the legal 157 
process as well, and their levels of expenditure are decision variables.  Thus the efficiency of 158 
eminent domain is dependent to some extent on whether the two parties spend few resources in 159 
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court or many.  Preventing the participants from making this decision on their own could bias 160 
efficiency in their eminent domain treatment positively or negatively. 161 
The fact that efficiency may be overstated in the contingent contracts treatment and 162 
overstated or understated in the eminent domain treatment makes it difficult to apply Kitchens’ 163 
and Roomets’ (2015) results to policy with high confidence.  We introduce an experimental 164 
design that incorporates delay costs, inefficient assembly, an uncertain fair market price and 165 
endogenous legal expenditures.   166 
[Table 1 Here] 167 
III. Experiment Design 168 
A. Overview of the Negotiation Environment 169 
Our experiment design is inspired by the work of Shupp et al. (2013), who investigated 170 
land assembly under conditions of uncertainty regarding the valuations of the buyer and sellers.  171 
We model an environment in which one buyer negotiates with two owners (the sellers) through a 172 
finitely repeated process of offers and responses.
 3
  The buyer makes simultaneous independent 173 
offers to the sellers, who may accept or reject them. 174 
In our experiments each seller   had a private valuation,   , for his own parcel .  175 
Valuations were denominated in “points” that were redeemed for cash at the end of the 176 
experiment.  The    were drawn (with replacement) from a discrete uniform distribution with 177 
support [      ] and  (  )    .  The buyer’s WTP for either of the parcels alone was zero, 178 
but his WTP for the pair of them was  , which was drawn from a uniform distribution with 179 
support [       ] and  ( )     .  Note that assembly was efficient in expectation but was 180 
                                                          
3
 Our experiments required the buyer to assemble both parcels to receive a payoff.  See Asami (1988) and Asami 
and Teraki (1990) for models that allows for assembling subsets of the parcels.   
10 
 
inefficient with non-zero probability.  Agents knew their own valuation but only the distributions 181 
from which their counterparts’ valuations were drawn. 182 
 Negotiation lasted up to 5 periods, which was common knowledge.  In each period the 183 
buyer offered a bid,   , to each seller who had not yet agreed to sell her parcel.  Sellers could 184 
only accept or reject an offer; they could not make a counteroffer.  The bids were contingent: if 185 
only one seller had accepted a bid by the end of period 5 the buyer did not purchase her parcel. 186 
Prolonged negotiation was costly.  Following Cadigan, et al. (2009) we modeled the costs 187 
of delay as a penalty assessed against all agents’ payoffs.  Specifically, if both sellers accepted an 188 
offer by period  , then all payoffs were multiplied by       (   ).  Thus, if both sellers 189 
accepted their offers in period 1 there was no cost of delay, while the cost was nonzero and 190 
monotonically increasing in all subsequent periods.   191 
We tested land assembly within this general negotiation environment in three treatment 192 
conditions. In the first (Baseline) the buyer’s only profit opportunity was to purchase the parcels 193 
from the sellers without recourse to eminent domain.  In the second treatment (Competition) the 194 
buyer could purchase a substitute parcel of land instead of assembling the fragmented parcels.  195 
The substitute was not as valuable to the buyer as the fragmented parcels, however, so that the 196 
competitive pressure on the sellers was weak.  In the third treatment (Eminent Domain) the buyer 197 
could invoke eminent domain and the parcel’s price was determined by a Tullock Contest.  A 198 
high or low price could result from the contest, and a contestant’s probability of achieving his 199 
preferred price was proportional to the amount of money he spent in the contest.   200 
B. Baseline Treatment: Secure Property 201 
 Participants made their decisions through an electronic computer interface.  In the 202 
Baseline buyers and sellers saw a matrix of two squares labeled (1) and (2), which represented 203 
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the sellers’ parcels.  In the first negotiating period the buyer submitted simultaneous private 204 
offers to both sellers.  Each seller saw her offer in her square of the matrix and indicated her 205 
decision by clicking one of two buttons labelled “accept” and “reject.”  Once a seller had 206 
accepted an offer negotiations for her parcel concluded at the price she had agreed to.  If at least 207 
one seller had rejected her offer the negotiation went on to the next period.  Contracts were 208 
contingent; the buyer only paid a seller the agreed price if both sellers accepted an offer. 209 
In a single-period negotiation the buyer’s optimal strategy is simple to calculate because 210 
sellers should accept any offer      .  Since the    are drawn from the same distribution the 211 
buyer has no reason to submit different offers to the two sellers, and so in equilibrium      .  212 
Thus, we omit the subscripts in the following analysis. 213 
 The buyer’s expected profit,  ( ), is a function of his value and offers: 214 
 ( )  (    ) (
    
  
)
 
 
(1) 215 
The first term in (1) is the profit earned by the buyer if both sellers accept and the second term is 216 
the probability that his offers exceed both of the their values.  Solving the first order condition of 217 
(1) for   yields the equilibrium bid function: 218 
   
    
 
 
(2) 219 
With multiple bargaining periods it becomes difficult to succinctly model buyer behavior 220 
after the first period because his best strategy will depend on his beliefs about the sellers.  221 
Suppose at least one seller rejects her offer in period one.  If the buyer believes that the sellers 222 
would only reject an offer that is below their value then in the second period he will incorporate 223 
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any accepted offer into the first term of equation (1), substitute the first period    for    in its 224 
second term and solve for the new equilibrium offer.  But if he believes that the sellers are 225 
holding out strategically, then he will not change his offers in the second period.  A third 226 
possibility is that the buyer places a non-zero probability on the sellers rejecting strategically, in 227 
which case he will revise his second period offer(s) upward, but by a smaller amount than if he 228 
believed them to be sincere. 229 
In their turn, the sellers’ optimal behavior depends on their beliefs about the buyers’ 230 
beliefs.  If they believe him to think they are strategic, then strategic holdout will not be 231 
profitable because it will incur the delay cost without increasing the buyer’s offers in period two.  232 
If they believe him to think they will only reject sincerely – i.e., reject offers below their values – 233 
they will hold out in period 1 so long as the difference in equilibrium offers is greater than 234 
      . 235 
The multiplicity of plausible outcomes implies that we cannot predict behavior in the 236 
Baseline beyond period 1 with any confidence without knowing the beliefs of the agents.  237 
However, earlier empirical work by Zillante, Read and Schwarz (2014) and Shupp, et al. (2013) 238 
suggests that offers will rise over time.  For the current study we will use the equilibrium offer 239 
function as a benchmark for buyer offers in the first period. 240 
C. Competition Treatment: Secure Property with a Substitute Parcel 241 
 In our Competition treatment the buyer faced the two sellers as in the Baseline, but also 242 
had the option of buying a substitute parcel of land.  The substitute parcel was displayed on 243 
participants’ screens as a rectangle to the right of the matrix representing the primary parcels.  244 
For clarity we will refer to the two fragmented parcels as the “primary parcels” and their owners 245 
as the “primary sellers.”  We will refer to the owner of the substitute parcel as the “alternative 246 
seller.”  The buyer’s induced value for the substitute parcel was 80% of  his induced value for 247 
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the two primary parcels.  The substitute parcel was of no additional value to the buyer if he 248 
purchased both of the primary parcels.   249 
The buyer initially made his offers to the primary sellers as in the Baseline.  If one or 250 
both of them rejected his offer, the buyer then submitted an offer to the alternative seller.  The 251 
delay cost for the period was only incurred if the alternative seller rejected her offer.  Contracts 252 
were contingent, as above. 253 
The alternative seller had a valuation for her parcel,   , that was drawn from the uniform 254 
distribution [      ] with  (  )     .  Notice that the expected surplus from assembling the 255 
primary parcels was  ( )    (  )            , while the expected surplus from 256 
buying the substitute parcel was 0.8 ( )   (  )            , so purchasing the 257 
substitute parcel was not socially optimal on average. 258 
We again use the one-period model as our benchmark.  If the buyer is forced to make an 259 
offer to the alternative seller, his expected profit function is: 260 
 (  )  (       ) (
     
  
) 
(3) 261 
 Solving the first order condition of (3) for    yields the equilibrium alternative bid function: 262 
  
          
(4) 263 
This implies that in equilibrium the buyer’s expected profit from dealing with the alternative 264 
seller is: 265 
 (  
 )  
(       ) 
  
 
(5) 266 
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Given that failing to assemble the primary parcels will still generate an expected profit of 267 
 (  
 ), the buyer’s expected profit when he is making an offer to the primary sellers is now: 268 
 ( )  (    ) (
    
  
)
 
  (  
 ) (  (
    
  
)
 
) 
(6) 269 
We may solve the first order condition of (6) for   to find the equilibrium offer function: 270 
   
      (  
 )
 
 
(7) 271 
Comparing the equilibrium offer functions (2) and (7) we see that the presence of the alternative 272 
seller reduces the buyer’s equilibrium offers to the primary sellers by one third of the expected 273 
profit from dealing with the alternative seller.   274 
Allowing for multiple periods causes equilibrium behavior to become ambiguous for the 275 
reasons discussed in the previous section.  However, seller holdout was riskier in the 276 
Competition treatment due to the risk that the buyer would commit to a contract with the 277 
competing party (or parties).  Consequently, we expect to see less seller holdout in this 278 
environment. 279 
D. Eminent Domain Treatment 280 
 In the Eminent Domain treatment the buyer was allowed to force a seller who had 281 
rejected his offer to sell.  This was done by clicking a button labelled “Force Sale” next to a 282 
seller’s property.  If the buyer invoked eminent domain the fair market value was decided 283 
through a simulated litigation process.  The price the buyer paid was determined by the amount 284 
he and the seller spent on litigation.  Neither the buyer nor the seller were allowed to spend so 285 
much that they could make negative earnings.  The most the seller could spend was equal to the 286 
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low price that could result from the contest.  The most that the buyer could spend was calculated 287 
based on his value and any price he had already agreed to or other contest he was in.  This 288 
maximum was set so that even if the buyer had to pay the high price in the contest his total 289 
expenditures would not exceed his value.  The delay cost was incurred at the end of a period only 290 
if at least one seller rejected her offer and the buyer did not force her to sell. 291 
If the buyer and seller spent nothing then the fair market value was 50, the lower bound 292 
of the seller’s value distribution.  This is consistent with a prevailing market price of land less 293 
than or equal to all landowner’s valuations.  If one or both spent an amount greater than zero 294 
then the fair market price was assessed to be 40 if the buyer won the contest and 60 if the seller 295 
won.
4
  The winner was determined probabilistically, with the probability that one contestant wins 296 
equal to the amount he spends in the contest divided by the sum of both contestants’ spending.  297 
Notice that the litigation process effectively offered the buyer and seller a prize equal to 20, the 298 
difference between the high and low prices.  We may therefore analyze the legal process as a 299 
simple Tullock Contest.  It is straightforward to show that with two players the Nash Equilibrium 300 
in such a contest is for each party to spend one fourth of the prize (Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 301 
2011).  Thus, we would expect the buyer and seller to each spend 5 points if the buyer forced a 302 
sale. 303 
 Of course, the influence costs of a court battle should act as a deterrent to invoking 304 
eminent domain in the first place.  The buyer knows that if he takes the seller to court the seller’s 305 
expected profit will be equal to the expected price she will receive minus the amount she spends 306 
in court costs.  Thus, the buyer’s optimal bid offers the sellers an amount that leaves them 307 
                                                          
4
 This range of prices is conservative.  Munch (1976) found that eminent domain prices ranged from 28% below her 
estimate of market value to more than 100% above it.  More recently, Chang (2010) estimated the fair market value 
of condemned properties in New York City from 1990 – 2002.  He found that for many properties compensation 
was as low as 50% below fair market value and as high as 50% above it. 
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indifferent between accepting his offer and going to court.  Given our parameters this means that 308 
     .  Notice this implies that theoretically the threat of eminent domain is sufficient for land 309 
assembly.  We would therefore expect no forced sales in our Eminent Domain treatment. 310 
E. Procedures 311 
The parameters of the experiment are summarized in Table 2.  Sellers earned their input 312 
values even if they did not sell, while buyers only received payment if they assembled both 313 
parcels.  For this reason we varied the exchange rate between points and dollars by role.  Buyers 314 
received $1.00 for every 2 points, primary sellers $1.00 for every 4 points and alternative sellers 315 
$1.00 for every 7 points due to their higher average input value.  These exchange rates ensured 316 
that all participants could earn roughly the same cash payment in the experiment.  We kept the 317 
exchange rates private, but told the participants that their counterparts’ exchange rates may be 318 
different from their own.  The combination of uncertain value draws and private exchange rates 319 
made it very difficult for participants to infer their counterpart’s earnings.  As a result, we would 320 
expect other-regarding preferences to be minimized (Cooper and Kagel, 2015). 321 
[Table 2 Here] 322 
We recruited 150 undergraduate and graduate students at a university in the American 323 
Southwest.  The participants came from a pool of approximately 2,000 who had signed up in 324 
advance to participate in economic experiments.  Each participant was in only one treatment.  325 
We paid them $7 for attending plus earnings that they received from their decisions in the 326 
experiment ($16.22 on average).  Experimental sessions lasted 30 – 60 minutes, including time 327 
for instructions.  328 
Participants sat at desks separated by privacy dividers.  Each received a half-page 329 
summary of the rules of the experiment as well as important parameter information, such as the 330 
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distributions from which values would be drawn.  An experimenter read the instructions aloud 331 
from a script, pausing at predetermined points to elicit questions and answer them.  We projected 332 
screenshots of the user interface on a screen at the front of the laboratory. 333 
We described the decision space as neutrally as possible to focus the participants’ 334 
attention on their own profit calculations rather than their personal feelings about eminent 335 
domain.  We called the parcels of land “inputs” that the buyer wished to purchase and referred to 336 
a “forced sale” rather than eminent domain or condemnation, and a “contest” rather than a 337 
litigation process.     338 
Negotiations in all treatments were strictly private.  Sellers never saw one another’s 339 
offers, nor were they informed whether another seller had accepted her offer except when the 340 
buyer succeeded in assembling the primary inputs or bought the alternative input.  In the Eminent 341 
Domain treatment sellers did not know if the other seller in their group had been forced to sell.  342 
When competing in a contest neither contestant was told how much their opponent had spent.  343 
Each experiment session consisted of 3 rounds.  Each round was a separate negotiation.  344 
Participants took the same role in every round, but were matched into different groups.  To keep 345 
the negotiations independent across rounds we re-matched the participants so that they were 346 
never grouped with any of the same counterparts more than once.  This prevented participants 347 
from rewarding or punishing one another for their decisions in prior rounds.  The number of 348 
rounds and uniqueness of each round’s grouping was common knowledge.  After the third round 349 
the computer software randomly chose one of the rounds for each participant.  The participant 350 
was paid according to his earnings in that round’s negotiation. 351 
To facilitate unique groups we conducted the Baseline and Eminent Domain treatments in 352 
sessions with nine participants organized into three groups – three buyers and six sellers.  This 353 
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allowed us to obtain nine observations from each session.  For the Competition treatment every 354 
session used twenty participants organized into five groups – five buyers, ten primary sellers and 355 
five alternative sellers.  This allowed us to obtain fifteen observations per session.  We 356 
conducted 5 sessions of the Baseline and Eminent Domain treatments and three sessions of the 357 
Competition treatment, giving us 45 negotiations for each treatment. (See Table 3.) 358 
[Table 3 Here] 359 
IV. Experiment Results 360 
A. Benchmark simulations and an overview of results 361 
 We conducted simulations to find the best-case outcomes that could occur in our 362 
experiments if buyers submitted their equilibrium offers and sellers did not hold out.   In the 363 
Baseline and Competition simulations the sellers accepted offers greater than or equal to their 364 
values and this was known to the buyers.  The simulated buyers responded to rejected offers by 365 
revising their offers upward optimally in the subsequent period.  In the simulated Eminent 366 
Domain treatment sellers always accepted their offers, so that the buyers never invoked eminent 367 
domain.  For each treatment we used the same parameter draws as those in the experiments with 368 
human participants.  We recorded the buyers’ opening offers, number of negotiating periods, 369 
efficiency and the use of eminent domain.  This provides us with a benchmark for comparison to 370 
the outcomes from our experiments.   371 
[Table 4 Here] 372 
Table 4 displays the results of our simulations for each treatment alongside the observed 373 
results of our experiments.  Participants in the Baseline performed below the benchmark.  The 374 
average opening offer was less than the average equilibrium offer.  This, combined with some 375 
holdout among sellers resulted in more delay in the experiments than in our simulations.  376 
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Consequently, on average the participants captured only 81.2% of the available surplus on 377 
average, compared to 88.5% in the simulations. 378 
Outcomes in the Competition treatment were roughly equal to the benchmark.  The 379 
average opening offer of 64.4 was only 6% less than the average equilibrium offer of 68.5.  The 380 
number of negotiating periods was nearly identical in the simulations and the experiments.  On 381 
average the participants captured 89.9% of the available surplus, slightly more than the 382 
benchmark of 89.5%. 383 
In the Eminent Domain experiments the buyers’ offers were more generous to the sellers 384 
than theory would predict.  Nevertheless, many sellers did not accept their opening offers, which 385 
led to some delay and many instances of forced sales.  Across all negotiations 41.1% of sellers 386 
were forced to sell their inputs.  The high rate of eminent domain lead to considerable spending 387 
to determine fair market prices.  The average spending was 15.7 for buyers and 15.9 for sellers, 388 
more than triple the equilibrium of 5.  This resulted in an average efficiency of 80.6%, compared 389 
to 95.1% in the benchmark simulations.  390 
Notice that in our simulations the Eminent Domain treatment had the highest average 391 
efficiency (95.1%), followed by Competition (89.5%) and the Baseline (88.5%). That is, the 392 
experimental environment was the most favorable to achieving high levels of surplus with 393 
eminent domain.  Yet participants in the Eminent Domain treatment of the experiments captured 394 
the least of the available surplus.  Below we explore the results of our experiments in more 395 
detail.  396 
B. Buyer offers 397 
 In Figure 1 we present the average deviation of the buyers’ first and final offers from our 398 
theoretical predictions for each treatment.  In the Baseline treatment the average first period offer 399 
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was 58.6, which is 22.7% below the average equilibrium offer of 75.8.  This was not due to a 400 
small number of outliers.  Of the 45 first offers in the Baseline, 38 (84.4%) were below the 401 
optimal offer given the buyer’s value.  We compared the first period offers to those in the 402 
benchmark simulations with a Wilcoxon sign rank test.  The unit of analysis was the average of a 403 
buyer’s two offers in the first period of the round.  We can reject the null hypothesis that first 404 
period offers in the Baseline treatment were no different from the equilibrium with high 405 
confidence (p < 0.001). 406 
[Figure 1 Here] 407 
 The Baseline offers did increase in subsequent periods, but remained overly conservative.  408 
The average final offer in the Baseline was 69.5.  60% of these final offers were below the Nash 409 
Equilibrium.  A Mann-Whitney test comparing a buyer’s final offer of the round with his first 410 
offer indicates that the difference is statistically significant (p < 0.001).  However, even by the 411 
end of negotiations the typical buyer in the Baseline offered the sellers 8.3% less than would 412 
have been optimal in the first period (Wilcoxon sign rank test, p = 0.002). 413 
 The pattern was similar in the Competition treatment, but not as pronounced as the 414 
Baseline.  The average buyer’s value was 168 points, which implied an average first offer of 415 
68.5.  Buyers’ offers were 64.4 on average, or approximately 6% below equilibrium.  The 416 
difference between optimal and observed offers is marginally statistically significant (Wilcoxon 417 
p = 0.059) but rather small in economic significance.  The average final offer in the Competition 418 
treatment was 70.1, which is not statistically different than the equilibrium first-period offer 419 
(Wilcoxon, p = 0.592).  Overall, 42.2% of first offers and 22.2% of final offers were below 420 
equilibrium in the Competition treatment. 421 
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 Notice that introducing competition among the sellers was predicted to reduce buyers’ 422 
average offers by 7.3 points.  Instead the buyers increased their offers by an average of almost 10 423 
points.  In the Baseline treatment buyers may have made low offers in an effort to avoid 424 
overpaying one of the sellers and thereby constraining their ability to make an adequate offer to 425 
the other.  In the buyers’ minds this risk may have dominated the risk that making low offers 426 
would drag out the negotiations and increase the risk of assembly failure.  Overpaying a primary 427 
seller was less of a concern in the Competition treatment because even if the buyer found himself 428 
unable to make a sufficiently high offer to one of the primary sellers he might still negotiate a 429 
contract with the alternative seller.  Mann-Whitney tests do not find the distributions of first or 430 
final offers to be statistically different between the Baseline and Competition treatments (p = 431 
0.263 and p = 0.765).  However, we also compared offers in these treatments by performing chi-432 
squared tests of the frequency of offering less than the equilibrium prediction.  Buyers in the 433 
Baseline were more likely to offer less than the equilibrium in both their first and final offers (p 434 
< 0.001 in both cases).   435 
 While offers under secure property tended to be too low, under eminent domain the 436 
buyers did not fully exploit the strength of their bargaining position.  The average first offer was 437 
56 in the Eminent Domain treatment.  This is 24.4% higher than the equilibrium offer of 45, and 438 
a Wilcoxon sign rank test indicates that the difference is statistically significant (p < 0.001).  The 439 
buyers may have been motivated by fear that sellers would view the equilibrium offer as unfair 440 
and reject it to punish them.  This would force both sides to spend money in the Tullock Contest, 441 
and could be viewed as a form of costly punishment.  Henrich, et al. (2006) have shown that the 442 
willingness to engage in costly punishment is a feature of a wide range of human societies.   443 
  444 
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C. Seller holdout 445 
 To analyze seller holdout, we found the highest offer that a seller rejected in a round and 446 
subtracted her input value from it.  Where this normalized highest rejected offer is greater than 447 
zero we consider the seller to have withheld her input strategically.  The cumulative distributions 448 
of the normalized highest rejected offers are shown in Figure 2.  A vertical line at the value of 449 
zero separates the shares of each distribution that represent strategic rejections from sincere 450 
rejections. 451 
[Figure 2 Here] 452 
 Sellers in the Baseline strategically rejected the buyer’s offer in 22.6% of cases.  Notice 453 
that this is substantially less than the percentage of buyers in the same treatment who made offers 454 
that were lower than the equilibrium.  60% of the buyers’ final offers were below equilibrium.  If 455 
we consider these low offers to be buyer holdout then buyers held out 2.7 times as often as 456 
sellers.  Moreover, in Section IV d. below we demonstrate that the loss of efficiency from delay 457 
was mainly due to buyer holdout.  Our findings run counter to the conventional wisdom that 458 
sellers are primarily responsible for the difficulties of land assembly.   459 
 In the Competition treatment the primary sellers strategically rejected far fewer offers.  In 460 
6.7% of cases a primary seller’s highest rejected offer exceeded her value, a 70.4% reduction 461 
compared to the Baseline.  A chi-square analysis confirms that holdout was statistically less 462 
frequent in the Competition treatment compared to the Baseline (p = 0.013).  The effect of 463 
competition on strategic holdout is especially impressive when we compare it to eminent 464 
domain.  Sellers in the Eminent Domain treatment rejected profitable offers in 4.3% of cases.  A 465 
chi-square test cannot reject the null hypothesis that holdout rates were equal in the Eminent 466 
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Domain and Competition treatments (p = 0.609).  That is, introducing a weak form of 467 
competition was just as effective at discouraging seller holdout as eminent domain. 468 
D. Efficiency 469 
 Eminent domain did not increase the gains from trade, but weak competition did.  As we 470 
noted above average efficiency was highest in the Competition treatment (89.9%), followed by 471 
the Baseline (81.2%) and Eminent Domain treatments (80.6%).  We compared the outcomes 472 
across treatments with pair-wise Mann-Whitney tests.  Efficiency was statistically 473 
indistinguishable between the Baseline and Eminent Domain treatment (p = 0.971), but it was 474 
statistically significantly higher in the Competition treatment than in the Baseline (p = 0.012) and 475 
Eminent Domain treatments (p = 0.045).   476 
[Table 5 Here] 477 
In Table 5 we provide complete information regarding the number of points that could 478 
have been earned in each treatment, along with how many points were earned and the number of 479 
points that were lost due to the various possible sources of inefficiency.  In the Baseline 480 
participants failed to capture a total of 1,498 points, or 18.1% of the available surplus.  Of these, 481 
1,237 points (82.6%) were lost due to delay, and 225 (15%) were lost due to assembly failure.  482 
We have already noted that both sellers and buyers held out in the form of rejected offers above 483 
seller’s values and offers below Nash equilibrium.  Which form of holdout cost more in terms of 484 
lost gains from trade?  We addressed this question by simulating two counterfactuals: a no seller 485 
holdout (NSH) counterfactual and a no buyer holdout (NBH) counterfactual.  For the NSH 486 
counterfactual we simulated buyers whose offers were identical to those submitted by the human 487 
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buyers and sellers who accepted all offers that were greater than or equal to their value.
5
  This 488 
allows us to measure how efficient the negotiations would have been without seller holdout, 489 
holding observed buyer decisions constant.  We conducted 45 simulations for the NSH 490 
counterfactual; one for each negotiation in the experiments. 491 
For the NBH counterfactual we simulated buyers who submitted their equilibrium offers 492 
and sellers who accepted the offers probabilistically.  We constructed an acceptance probability 493 
function using the decisions that the human sellers had made in our experiments.  For each offer 494 
that a human seller had accepted we subtracted the seller’s value from the offer to find the 495 
normalized accepted offer.  The probability that a simulated seller in the NBH counterfactual 496 
accepted its offer was equal to the proportion of human sellers who had accepted a normalized 497 
offer of equal or lesser value.  This allows us to measure how efficient the negotiations would 498 
have been without buyer holdout, holding observed seller behavior constant.  Due to the 499 
probabilistic nature of the simulated sellers’ decisions we conducted 1,000 simulations for each 500 
negotiation in the experiments, for a total of 45,000. 501 
[Figure 3 Here] 502 
Figure 3 displays the average efficiency in the observed Baseline negotiations, as well as 503 
those in the NSH and NBH counterfactuals.  As the chart makes clear, buyer holdout was more 504 
detrimental to efficiency than seller holdout.  In the NSH counterfactual the average efficiency 505 
was 84%; only 2.8 percentage points higher than the observed Baseline efficiency.  For the NBH 506 
counterfactual the average efficiency was 90.2%; 9 percentage points higher than the human 507 
participants achieved.  Both of these differences are statistically significant according to 508 
Wilcoxon sign rank tests (p = 0.033 for NSH, p < 0.001 for NBH).  Notice that average 509 
                                                          
5
 In some cases sellers in the laboratory experiments accepted offers that were below their values.  We replicated 
these decisions in the NSH counterfactual, so that the simulated sellers never rejected an offer that had been 
accepted by their human counterparts. 
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efficiency was higher in the NBH simulations than in our benchmark simulations.  This is 510 
because the human sellers accepted offers below their values in 52.9% of cases, most likely to 511 
avoid delay costs.  As a result, negotiations lasted for an average of 2.8 periods in the NBH 512 
simulations versus 3.3 periods in the benchmark simulations. In the NSH simulations and 513 
laboratory experiments the average negotiation took 3.9 and 4.2 periods respectively. 514 
Participants were able to capture the highest share of the surplus in the Competition 515 
treatment.  Average efficiency was 89.9% in the Competition treatment compared to 81.2% in 516 
the Baseline.  This was primarily due to a reduction in delay.  The average duration was 2.7 517 
periods for all Competition negotiations and 2.1 for those where there was positive surplus 518 
available from assembly.  Wilcoxon sign rank tests indicate that these were not statistically 519 
different than the benchmark simulation averages of 3 and 1.8 (p > 0.25 in both cases). 520 
The buyers in the Competition treatment made a purchase in 93.8% of negotiations where 521 
there were positive gains from trade.  They purchased the parcel(s) that generated the higher 522 
surplus 65.6% of the time.  For each negotiation where the buyer’s purchase generated less 523 
surplus than if he had negotiated an agreement with the other seller(s), we calculated the 524 
difference in surplus between the two possible contracts.  This allows us to determine the 525 
opportunity cost in efficiency from purchasing the wrong input(s).  The total opportunity cost 526 
was 304 points, which is only 2.2% of the available surplus in the Competition treatment. 527 
Average efficiency was 80.6% in the Eminent Domain treatment, which is not 528 
statistically different than in the Baseline.  Delay and failed assembly did not substantially affect 529 
efficiency in the Eminent Domain treatment.  Only two negotiations failed to result in assembly 530 
because the buyer could not afford to force both sellers to sell.  In both of these negotiations the 531 
sellers valued their inputs more than the buyer, so no points were lost from assembly failure.  532 
26 
 
The average duration was 1.4 periods for all negotiations and 1.2 periods for negotiations with 533 
gains from trade.  As a result, only 157 points (1.9% of available surplus) were lost due to delay. 534 
However, spending in the Tullock Contest was more than 200% higher than predicted.  In 535 
theory the buyer and seller should both spend 5 points.  In fact, buyers spent an average of 15.7 536 
points and sellers an average of 15.9 points.  These high averages were due in part to very high 537 
spending by a few participants.  However, median spending was 10 points for both buyers and 538 
sellers; 100% higher than equilibrium.  Wilcoxon sign rank tests confirm that spending was 539 
statistically higher than equilibrium for buyers and sellers (p < 0.01 for both roles).  This is 540 
consistent with prior studies on spending in Tullock Contests (see Dechenaux, Kovenock and 541 
Sheremeta, 2015) 542 
Since litigation costs were the main cause of efficiency loss in the Eminent Domain 543 
treatment it is reasonable to consider how sensitive our results are to the variance in prices that 544 
could result from the contest.  Our parameters required the litigated price to be either 40 or 60; 545 
i.e., 20% above or below the true fair market value.  The litigated price range determines the size 546 
of the contest’s prize.  Consequently, we would expect a direct relationship between the width of 547 
the prices and the level of spending. 548 
To estimate the sensitivity of our results to the litigated price range we recalculated the 549 
efficiency in the Eminent Domain treatment according to two counterfactuals.  In both 550 
counterfactuals we assumed that the contestants spent a fixed fraction of the prize.  This fraction 551 
was calculated for each contestant using the observed spending amounts for the numerator and 552 
the observed prize (20 points) in the denominator.  In one counterfactual (narrow range) we 553 
reduced the litigated price range to be 10% above or below the fair market value.  In the second 554 
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counterfactual (wide range) we followed the estimates of Chang (2010) that litigated range from 555 
50% below fair market value (25 points) to 50% above it (75 points). 556 
In our narrow range counterfactual average efficiency in the Eminent Domain treatment 557 
increased to 87.6%, statistically significantly greater than the Baseline (Mann-Whitney test, p = 558 
0.022).  This indicates that where courts face less uncertainty over fair market value eminent 559 
domain is likely to be more efficient.  However, in the wide range counterfactual the average 560 
efficiency is 61.4%, which is statistically significantly less than the Baseline (Mann-Whitney 561 
test, p = 0.031).  Given that the wide range counterfactual is based on empirical estimates, it is 562 
reasonable to treat the results of our laboratory experiments as an optimistic comparison of the 563 
efficiency of eminent domain versus sovereign property rights.  We advise caution in relying on 564 
these counterfactual results, however, because they rely on the assumption that spending 565 
strategies do not vary with the range of litigated prices. 566 
Theoretically, sellers should accept any offer of 45 points or higher, and the average first 567 
offer in the Eminent Domain treatment was 56 points.  Thus, we would expect litigation to be 568 
infrequent, but that was not the case.  The buyer invoked eminent domain against at least one 569 
seller in 44.4% of negotiations and against both sellers in 11.1% of negotiations.  As a result, 570 
participants spent 1,149 points to influence the fair market price.  This accounts for 73.9% of all 571 
points lost in the Eminent Domain treatment and 13.7% of the maximum available surplus.  572 
Notice that this is almost the same amount that was lost due to delay in the Baseline.  What 573 
eminent domain gave through faster negotiation it took away through influence costs. 574 
V. General Discussion 575 
The results of these experiments push our understanding about eminent domain and 576 
collective action in three ways.  First, we find that – contrary to the conventional wisdom – a 577 
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large majority of sellers do not hold out even when the buyer has no alternative to assembly or 578 
recourse to eminent domain.  Rather, in our experiments it was primarily the buyers who held out 579 
for an outsized share of the surplus by making offers that were below the profit maximizing 580 
level, and buyer holdout was 3 times as costly as seller holdout.  It seems a perverse response 581 
under such circumstances to give buyers the right to cut short the bargaining process and force 582 
the sale of property.  The pattern of buyer holdout across the Baseline and Competition 583 
treatments suggests that buyers held out to avoid overpaying one seller, leaving them with 584 
insufficient funds to offer an acceptable price to the other.  If this is the case it suggests that 585 
competition among sellers is important not only to break up seller holdout, but to give buyers 586 
flexibility in how they achieve assembly, resulting in higher offers. 587 
Second, eminent domain did not enhance the efficiency of negotiated outcomes.  The 588 
surplus that was saved by avoiding delay was spent in litigation costs.  One possible policy 589 
response would be to curtail or eliminate the degree to which litigants can influence the price of 590 
condemned property.  Yet such a policy would run directly counter to democratic principles of 591 
due process, and it would also open landowners to predatory behavior on the part of government 592 
officials.  An alternative policy response would be to place a high burden on the party invoking 593 
eminent domain to demonstrate that the gains from assembling the properties is very large.  594 
Eminent domain ought not to be invoked to achieve modest improvements in land use due to the 595 
risk that influence costs will meet or exceed the gains from trade. 596 
Third, we find that even weak competition is sufficient to break down seller holdout and 597 
improve economic efficiency.  When our buyers had an outside option to assembling the primary 598 
sellers’ parcels, seller holdout was not statistically higher than when the buyers could force a 599 
sale.  Having an available substitute also increased the buyers’ offers relative to the theoretical 600 
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equilibrium.  The availability of a substitute parcel reduced the duration of negotiations by 601 
35.7% overall (from 4.2 periods to 2.7 periods) and almost no surplus was lost due to assembly 602 
failure.  Comparing weak competition to eminent domain, participants captured 7.1 percentage 603 
points more of the available surplus under competition. 604 
The result that weak competition helps to navigate seller holdout strengthens the findings 605 
of Cadigan et al. (2011), Parente and Winn (2012) and Isaac, Kitchens and Portillo (2016) that 606 
competition among sellers makes land assembly quite easy.  Notice that in their studies the 607 
sellers competed with perfect substitutes, while in the present study the buyer incurred a 20% 608 
loss in value from buying the alternative parcel.  A straightforward implication for policy is that 609 
eminent domain should be restricted to cases where the assembling agent has no viable 610 
alternative to assembling a single set of properties.  An example would be the construction of a 611 
road through a mountain range with a single pass.  If the land along that pass is owned by 612 
multiple parties then eminent domain may be necessary to prevent strategic holdout from 613 
thwarting efficient assembly.  But suppose there is a second pass that is less suitable for a road, 614 
perhaps because it is further from the existing infrastructure or takes a more circuitous route 615 
through the mountains.  In this case eminent domain is less likely to be justified because an 616 
element of competition has been introduced which will break down seller holdout. 617 
More broadly, our findings also contribute to the study of the tragedy of the 618 
anticommons, of which the land assembly problem is a special case.  Legal research conjectures 619 
that, without a superordinate authority the tragedy of the anticommons is inevitable.  Indeed, 620 
scholars have long endorsed placing a superordinate authority over shared resources to navigate 621 
social dilemmas (e.g., Hardin 1968, Kollock 1998).  Our findings highlight that a superordinate 622 
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authority may reduce the negative externalities of seller holdout while imposing externalities of 623 
its own.  624 
The anticommons literature – and social dilemma research in general – typically assumes 625 
that resource management is a closed system with no outside alternatives; e.g., there is only one 626 
configuration of land amenable to development or one set of patents that will permit a suitable 627 
pharmaceutical treatment. Relaxing this assumption and taking an open system approach to the 628 
tragedy of the anticommons, as we have done with land assembly, introduces an effective 629 
substitute for superordinate authority.  630 
Our study does have some important limitations.  First, we did not vary the number of 631 
sellers, so we cannot measure how the degree of fragmentation interacts with the results reported 632 
here.  Cadigan, et al. (2011) have demonstrated that delay is exacerbated and assembly failure 633 
more common with a larger numbers of sellers.  Future research may benefit from examining 634 
whether the number of sellers makes land assembly more challenging, especially if sellers are 635 
allowed to form coalitions against prospective buyers.  Second, we did not vary environmental 636 
parameters, such as the magnitude of delay cost or the duration of the eminent domain process.  637 
Varying those parameters could affect the relative efficiencies of our Baseline and Eminent 638 
Domain treatments.  However, it is worth noting that Kitchens and Roomets (2015) also find that 639 
eminent domain does not increase efficiency in experiments that are distinct from our own.  640 
Finally, there were no externalities from assembly in our experiments, which may encourage 641 
seller holdout (O’Flaherty 1994).  Future scholarship may benefit from examining whether the 642 
knowledge of positive versus negative externalities to those directly involved in the land 643 
assembly impact seller holdouts.    644 
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Table 1. Summary of laboratory experiments of land assembly and holdout. 
Study Treatment Variables Main Findings 
Cadigan, Schmitt, Shupp 
and Swope (2009) 
1. Single period vs. multiperiod bargaining 
2. Costly vs. costless delay 
3. Buyer proposes vs. sellers propose 
1. Single period bargaining and costly delay made offers  
    more generous and holdout less likely, 
2. Both buyers and sellers rejected profitable proposals. 
3. 19 of 174 negotiations failed (10.9%).  Of these, 18 were  
    in single period treatments. 
Cadigan, Schmitt, Shupp 
and Swope (2011) 
1. Number of sellers (1 – 4) 
2. Costly delay (only with 2 – 4 sellers) 
3. Competition (only with 3 sellers) 
4. Buyer proposes vs. seller(s) propose(s) 
1. Without competition, buyers’ surplus fell monotonically  
    with the number of sellers, regardless if buyers or sellers  
    were proposing. 
2. Without competition, delay increased with the number of  
    Sellers. 
3. Competition reduced delay and increased the buyers’  
    Surplus. 
4. 8 of 300 negotiations failed (2.7%).  Of these, 6 were in  
    treatments with 4 sellers.  None were in treatments with  
    competing sellers. 
Swope, Wielgus, Cadigan 
and Schmitt (2011) 
1. Single period vs. multiperiod bargaining 
2. Simultaneous vs. sequential bargaining 
3. Contingent vs. non-contingent contracts 
1. 36 of 175 negotiations failed (20.6%). 
2. Single period negotiations failed more frequently than 
    multiperiod negotiations (29.4% vs. 12.2%). 
3. Sequential negotiations failed somewhat more frequently  
    than Simultaneous negotiations (16.7% vs. 12.5%). 
4. Negotiations failed more frequently with non-contingent 
    contracts than with contingent contracts (32.2% vs.  
    16.7%). 
Collins and Isaac (2012) 1. Contingent contracts vs. non-contingent  
    contracts with a capital constraint 
2. Private vs. public information regarding  
    buyers’ willingness to pay, capital  
    constraint, offers and acceptances 
1. Negotiations failed more frequently with constrained  
    non-contingent contracts than with contingent contracts  
    (6% vs. 54%). 
2. Negotiation failure was equally likely with private and  
    public information. 
3. Sellers who held out did not earn more on average than  
    sellers who did not. 
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4. Buyers’ expected earnings were equal with contingent  
    and non-contingent contracts, but variance was lower  
    with non-contingent contracts. 
Parente and Winn (2012) 1. Simultaneous vs. sequential offers to  
    sellers 
2. Low vs. high vs. uncertain signals of the  
    buyer’s maximum willingness to pay  
    (WTP) 
3. Strict complementarity (3 of 3 parcels  
    must be assembled) vs. partial  
    complementarity (2 of 3 parcels must be  
    assembled) 
1. Final prices were lower with a) simultaneous offers than  
    sequential offers, b) low signals of WTP than uncertain  
    or high signals, and c) partial complementarity than full  
    complementarity. 
2. With strict complementarity 14% of negotiations failed.   
    Failure rates were lower with sequential offers than  
    simultaneous offers. 
3. With partial complementarity less than 1% of  
    negotiations failed. 
Shupp, Cadigan, Schmitt 
and Swope (2013) 
1. Buyer proposes (first) vs. sellers propose 
    (first) 
2. Persistent proposer role vs. alternating  
    proposers role 
3. Buyer’s value and sellers’ costs known  
    (certain) vs. value and costs drawn from  
    known distributions (uncertain) 
1. 7 of 182 (3.8%) of negotiations failed. 
2. 5 of the failed negotiations (71.4%) occurred when  
    values and costs were uncertain. 
3. Final prices favored the (first) proposer. 
4. Final prices were not significantly different when the  
    buyer and sellers alternated proposals than when one side  
    proposed persistently. 
Cadigan, Schmitt and 
Swope (2014) 
1. Buyer proposes vs. sellers propose 
2. Costly vs. costless delay 
3. Symmetric delay costs to the buyer and  
    sellers vs. delay costs to the buyer only 
4. Multi-round negotiation required vs.  
    credible commitment to ultimatum offer 
1. Proposing buyers earned more when they had the option  
    to make an ultimatum offer.  Proposing sellers earned    
    less when they could make an ultimatum offer. 
2. A larger share of surplus went to sellers when delay costs  
    were asymmetric. 
3. 16 of 235 negotiations failed (6.8%).  Of these, 15  
    (93.8%) were in treatments with asymmetric delay costs.   
    10 of the failed negotiations (62.5%) were in treatments  
    where the proposer could make an ultimatum offer. 
Zillante, Read and Schwarz 
(2014) 
1. Contingent contracts vs. contracts with a  
    contingent payment and a non- 
    contingent payment (combination) 
2. Buyer’s value is known to sellers vs.  
    buyer’s value is unknown to sellers 
1. 16 of 66 negotiations failed (24.2%).  Neither of the  
    treatment variables had a statistically significant effect on  
    the rate of aggregation. 
2. Sellers rejected the buyers’ offers a total of 712 times.   
    296 of these rejections (41.6%) were strategic, in that the  
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    offer exceeded the seller’s property value. 
3. Negotiations were faster with contingent contracts.   
    However, buyers’ earnings were higher with contracts  
    that included a non-contingent component. 
Kitchens and Roomets 
(2015) 
Contingent contracts vs. eminent domain 
with fixed court costs 
1. Without eminent domain 1 of 12 negotiations (8.3%)  
    failed. 
2. With eminent domain 3 of 44 properties (6.8%) were  
    purchased through forced sale. 
3. Participants achieved 91.7% of the available gains from  
    trade without eminent domain and 93.2% with it.  The  
    difference was not statistically significant. 
4. Nash bargaining theory predicted that in the contingent  
    contracts treatment sellers who bargained earlier would  
    receive higher prices than those who bargained later.   
    However, sellers’ order in the queue had no effect on the  
    price at which they sold. 
Isaac, Kitchens and Portillo 
(2016) 
1. Fraction of properties required for  
    assembly (4 of 4 vs. 3 of 4 vs. 2 of 4) 
2. Presence vs. absence of an alternative  
    seller 
1. When assembly required 4 of 4 parcels 19 of 32  
    negotiations (59.4%) failed. 
2. With a 3 of 4 assembly requirement 5 of 32 negotiations  
    (15.6%) of negotiations failed. 
3. With a 2 of 3 assembly requirement 0 of 32 negotiations  
    failed. 
4. When the buyer could assemble 4 of 4 parcels or  
    purchase from an alternative seller 1 of 28 negotiations  
    (3.6%) failed 
 
38 
 
 
 
Table 2. Experimental parameters 
Parameter Value 
Buyer exchange rate $1.00 = 2 points 
Primary seller exchange rate $1.00 = 4 points 
Alternative seller exchange rate $1.00 = 7 points 
Distribution of primary sellers’ values,    [50,100] 
Distribution of buyer’s primary value,   [100,250] 
Buyer’s alternative value 0.8V 
Distribution of alternative seller’s value,    [80,160] 
Negotiating periods 5 
Delay cost per round 5% 
Set of fair market prices in contest  {        } 
 
Table 3. Sessions and observations by treatment 
Treatment Sessions Groups per Session Negotiations 
Baseline 5 3 45 
Competition 3 5 45 
Eminent Domain 5 3 45 
Total 13 -- 135 
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Table 4. Outcomes from our benchmark simulations of negotiations alongside observed results from our experiments.  We tested for 
differences between the benchmark and observed outcomes using Wilcoxon sign rank tests for continuous variables (opening offers, 
number of periods, efficiency and contest spending) and a binomial tests for the percent of sellers forced to sell. 
 
Measure Baseline Competition Eminent Domain 
 Optimal Observed Optimal Observed Optimal Observed 
Average opening offer 75.8 58.6
***
 68.5 64.4
†
 45 56
***
 
Average number of periods in all rounds 3.3 4.2
*
 3.0 2.7 1 1.4
***
 
Average number of periods when assembly produces surplus 2.3 3.75
**
 1.8 2.1 1 1.2
*
 
Average Efficiency 88.5% 81.2%
**
 89.5% 89.9% 95.1% 80.6%
***
 
Percent of sellers forced to sell -- -- -- -- 0% 33.3%
*** 
Buyer’s average contest spending -- -- -- -- 5 15.7** 
Seller’s average contest spending -- -- -- -- 5 15.9*** 
† Differs from benchmark at p < 0.10 
* Differs from benchmark at p < 0.05 
** Differs from benchmark at p < 0.01 
*** Differs from benchmark at p < 0.001 
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Table 5. The loss from delay in the Baseline Treatment is similar to the loss from contest 
spending in the Eminent Domain Treatment  
 Baseline Competition Eminent Domain 
Points Available 8,254 13,816 8,370 
Points Achieved 6,756 
(81.9%) 
12,227 
(88.5%) 
6,815 
(81.4%) 
Loss from delay 1,237 
(15.0%) 
1,114 
(8.1%) 
157 
(1.9%) 
Loss from failed assembly 225 
(2.7%) 
2 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Loss from inefficient assembly 36 
(0.4%) 
169 
(1.2%) 
249 
(3.0%) 
Opportunity cost of inefficient assembly -- 304 
(2.2%) 
-- 
Loss from contest spending -- -- 1,149 
(13.7%) 
Total Loss 1,498 
(18.1%) 
1,589 
(11.5%) 
1,555 
(18.6%) 
Note: Key findings bolded. 
 
Figure 1. Deviation of buyers’ average first and final offers from the theoretical prediction 
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Figure 2. Difference between highest rejected offer and seller’s value 
  
 
Figure 3. Average efficiency observed in the Baseline treatment and the simulated 
counterfactuals with no seller holdout and no buyer holdout. 
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